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The Mercantile-Industrial Transition in 
The Metals Towns of Pictou County, 
1857-1931* 
From the 1880s through to the early 1900s, many communities in the Mari-
times successfully made the transition from mercantile to industrial capitalism: 
trading centres developed manufacturing enterprise; resource communities 
acquired new technologies to process staples; entirely new industrial towns were 
established. But urban well-being was not sustained during the economic crisis 
of the 1920s, which forced factories to close, unemployment to increase, and 
people to migrate. The interpretation of this cycle of growth and decline has 
produced conflicting explanations of the urban-industrial collapse. Some have 
stressed entrepreneurial failure;1 others technological change in shipping,2 or a 
marginal location and poor resource endowment.3 The forces of continentalism 
have also been emphasized. According to this interpretation, freight rate altera-
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provided valuable service and stimulating discussion as a research assistant made possible by a 
grant from the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Fund of Mount Allison University. 
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tions,4 failed political prowess,5 business reorganization and concentration,6 and 
advantages accruing to external economies7 all favoured the growth of central 
Canadian cities over their Maritime counterparts. From these studies, some-
thing is known of the collapse in Cape Breton, Halifax, Saint John, Yarmouth, 
and several other places, but a consensus has yet to emerge in this debate about 
the precise explanation of the region's urban-industrial failure. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, Nova Scotia's mercantile economy was tied 
closely to the production and trade of staple commodities.8 The structure of 
colonial manufacturing was dominated by staple processing and commerce-
serving industries. In 1861 sawmilling and shipbuilding together accounted for 
just over 60 per cent of the total value of manufacturing. There was some grist 
milling and tanning, a little brewing and distilling, and the rudiments of local 
market manufacturing, but demand usually exceeded supply. Of necessity, most 
of Nova Scotia's requirements for hardware, machinery, textiles, furniture, 
glass, cordage, leather products, sugar, confectionery, and tobacco were satis-
fied by British and American imports. Even when production did take place, the 
scale of output was small. The largest industrial enterprise of the period, an iron 
works at Londonderry in Colchester County, employed fewer than forty men 
on a regular basis and turned out annually only about $40,000 worth of iron 
products.9 Few manufacturers employed a work force of more than ten men, 
although some of the sawmill and shipyard operators did on a seasonal basis. 
The spatial pattern of this manufacturing activity was itself typical of a mercan-
tile economy. Every county in Nova Scotia processed staple commodities for 
both domestic and export markets. Numerous grist mills were employed in 
grinding grain for local markets. The colony's sawmills shipped most of their 
products directly to foreign markets. The lumber trade was a rural industry 
which had only a limited impact on urban development in Nova Scotia.'0 Urban 
4 E.R. Forbes, "Misguided Symmetry: The Destruction of Regional Transportation Policy for the 
Maritimes", in D.J. Bercuson, ed., Canada and the Burden of Unity (Toronto, 1977), pp. 60-86. 
5 E.R. Forbes, The Maritimes Rights Movement, 1919-1927 (Montreal, 1979). 
6 J.D. Frost, "Principles of Interest: The Bank of Nova Scotia and the Industrialization of the 
Maritimes, 1880-1910" (MA thesis, Queen's University, 1979). 
7 B.S. Keirstead, The Theory of Economic Change (Toronto, 1948), pp. 269-81; McCann, 
"Staples and the New Industrialism in the Growth of Post-Confederation Halifax". 
8 In 1861, the agriculture, fishing, forestry, and mining sectors absorbed about two-thirds of the 
colony's labour force; their products and the sale of ships totalled nearly three-quarters of the 
value of exports. Calculated from data in Nova Scotia, Census Report of Nova Scotia, 1860-61, 
Appendix 5; and Nova Scotia, Journals and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1862, 
Appendix 1. 
9 Nova Scotia, Census Report of Nova Scotia, 1860-61, Appendix 8. 
10 In New Brunswick, by comparison, the timber trade had a strong impact on urban development. 
See G. Wynn, "Industrialism, Entrepreneurship, and Opportunity in the New Brunswick Timber 
Trade", in Fischer and Sager, eds.. The Enterprising Canadians, pp. 7-20. 
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ties with shipbuilding, though not strong, were somewhat more pronounced, but 
provincial centres suffered stiff competition in the ancilliary trades from Saint 
John, which had long controlled the Bay of Fundy economy.11 Local market 
manufacturing that did exist was concentrated in the more populous 
communities. Halifax dominated all, manufacturing over one-half of the 
colony's products.12 
It is clear that before Confederation the towns and cities of Nova Scotia had 
yet to experience the transforming effects of industrialization. Nova Scotia's 
policy of short-term tariffs and bounties was ineffective for fostering sustained 
industrial development, since these measures not only frequently conflicted with 
Imperial trade regulations, which were designed to restrict colonial manufactur-
ing, but they also pandered to merchants who were often hostile to manufactur-
ing enterprise.13 Indeed, the press of the period often printed words to the effect 
that "what our manufacturers want . . . is not a high protective duty, but a 
market".14 When petitioning the government for assistance, many manufacturers 
in all branches of industry cited the limited domestic market as the major deter-
rent impeding expansion.15 Further exacerbating the problem was the geo-
graphical fragmentation of the region: "a parcel of little principalities, everyone 
of them pulling a different way, while the parent state has been pulling against 
them all".16 Beyond these local limitations were the comparative advantages of 
foreign competitors. The United States and Great Britain had access to larger 
capital markets and cheaper industrial materials; both countries possessed more 
advanced technologies and skilled labour and they were able to enforce an effec-
tive protective tariff.17 By Confederation, however, there was mounting evi-
dence to suggest that Nova Scotia would overcome these obstacles and make the 
transition to industrial capitalism: manufacturing production doubled in the 
1860s as the domestic market finally grew and machine-oriented technologies 
were introduced; merchants appeared more willing to support new manufactur-
ing ventures; coal and iron deposits were claimed sufficient to provide the basis 
for an industrial "take-off; and political union with the Canadas promised a 
railroad to create access to larger markets.18 
11 T.W. Acheson, "The Great Merchant and Economic Development in St. John, 1820-1850", 
Acadiensis, VIII (Spring 1979), pp. 3-27; J.M.S. Careless, "Aspects of Metropolitanism in 
Atlantic Canada", in M. Wade, ed., Regionalism in the Canadian Community, 1867-1967 
(Toronto, 1969), pp. 117-29. 
12 Calculated from data in Nova Scotia, Census Report of Nova Scotia. 1860-61, Appendix 8. 
13 A.A. Lomas, "Industrial Development of Nova Scotia, 1830-1854" (MA thesis, Dalhousie 
University, 1950), pp. 129-49. 
14 Novâscotian (Halifax), 12 June 1848. 
15 Lomas, "Industrial Development of Nova Scotia", pp. 311-6. 
16 Novascotian, 12 June 1848. 
17 D. Campbell, History of Nova Scotia (Montreal, 1874), pp. 506-8. 
18 Discussion of the progress made in the economy at this time can be found in Campbell, History 
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The transformation of Nova Scotia's economic structure and the growth of its 
towns and cities in the post-Confederation period occurred simultaneously with 
the province's integration into the continental economy. Coal, iron, and steel 
industries, stimulated by external demand, spearheaded the transition from a 
mercantile to an industrial economy.19 All were essentially urban activities aided 
substantially by the National Policy of industrial incentives and tariff protec-
tion. Indeed, urbanization was greatly affected by this pattern of development. 
In 1871, only 17 per cent of Nova Scotia's population lived in places of 1,000 or 
more people. The proportion stood at 24 per cent in 1891, just over 35 per cent 
twenty years later, and 44 per cent in 1934. During the early stages of indus-
trialization, between 1871 and 1891, the trading communities of the mercantile 
era maintained leadership in size and business importance. By 1911, however, 
urban growth was more selective. The transition to industrial capitalism was 
most pronounced across the Cape Breton, Pictou, and Cumberland coal fields 
where the mining and manufacturing towns were typically either newly settled or 
considerably expanded in size. Glace Bay, New Waterford, Stellarton, West-
ville, and Springhill were essentially the products of externally controlled 
corporations. Industrial capitalism also made an impact on long-established 
commercial centres situated along the route of the Intercolonial railroad. 
Halifax headed the list of growing manufacturing cities on the strength of its 
entrepôt function; Dartmouth produced rope and hardware; Yarmouth manu-
factured cotton duck; Truro turned out hats and caps, woolens, and butter and 
cheese; Sydney and Sydney Mines manufactured primary steel; New Glasgow 
specialized in secondary steel products; and Amherst built railway cars, pianos, 
boots and shoes, foundry products, and woolen goods. Each place had expanded 
beyond its earlier mercantile function.20 
The impact of the transition to an industrial economy was ultimately only 
of Nova Scotia, pp. 506-17; A. Gesner, The Industrial Resources of Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1849), 
pp. 255-9 and 267-80. See also I. McKay, "Capital and Labour in the Halifax Baking and 
Confectionery Industry during the last Half of the Nineteenth Century", Labour/Le 
Travailleur, 3 (1978), pp. 65-108. 
19 The following comment, made in 1913, indicates the degree, if not the fragility, of the region's 
economic transformation: "When it is remembered that each wage earner represents, on the 
average, a family of four members, it follows that over 30,000 persons in Nova Scotia are 
directly dependent for their means of livelihood on this [steel] industry; or, including the 
associate industry of coal, in which case the number of men employed is increased to 26,000, over 
100,000 persons resident in the Province are dependent on the steel industry. In other words, if 
for any cause, the two largest companies discontinued operations, one out of every five persons 
living in the Province would be deprived of his or her present means of livelihood". C. Cantley, 
"A Sketch of the Development and Present Operations in the Iron and Steel Industry of Nova 
Scotia", Transactions of the Canadian Mining Institute, 16 (1913), p. 350. 
20 Nova Scotia, Journals and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1911, Appendix 15; 
Canadian Manufacture's Association, Evidence of the Industrial Ascendency of Nova Scotia 
(Halifax, 1914). 
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short-lived. Some trading centres, which were never really part of the transition, 
experienced decline as early as the 1880s, and as a group they continued to do so 
thereafter (Table 1). In the 1890s and 1900s, several staple producing com-
munities suffered losses as a consequence of depressed markets. By the 1920s, a 
region-wide collapse was clearly evident. Towns and cities that had previously 
grown rapidly now halted their progress either to stabilize in size or even to lose 
population. In fact, population reversals were experienced by eighteen of the 
province's thirty-seven urban communities. For the first time, once prosperous 
•manufacturing centres fell upon difficult times. Amherst, Sydney Mines, New 
Glasgow, and Trenton were the most notable examples. The fragile structure of 
the new industrialism stood revealed. 
Pictoii County exemplifies well the cycle of growth and decline associated 
with the mercantile-industrial transition (Table 2).21 The County is a natural 
and functional region which focuses on Pictou Harbour. Settlement has gener-
ally shunned the hills which surround the harbour to concentrate on the coal 
fields and to run along the several river valleys which flow north into the sea. In 
the mercantile period, this environment supported a fairly prosperous staple 
economy. Exports to foreign countries consistently exceeded international 
imports. At first the export trade was based on timber sales to Great Britain, but 
after mid-century coal shipped to the United States predominated (Figure 1). 
The town of Pictou, settled late in the eighteenth century by Presbyterian Scots, 
prospered through the early nineteenth century as a wholesale-trading centre. Its 
importance was challenged after Confederation by the growth of the coal 
industry at Stellarton (Albion Mines) and Westville, and by the emergence of 
Canada's first integrated metal-making and metal working complex at New 
Glasgow, Trenton, and Ferrona (Figures 2 - 5). The transition from a mercantile 
to an industrial economy was stimulated by several factors. After the monopoly 
of the General Mining Association was broken in 1857, American and Quebec 
capitalists invested heavily in the coal potential of the County. They were 
prompted by regional railway development, by Reciprocity with the United 
States (1854-1866), and by the expanding St. Lawrence market. The metals 
industry, in contrast, was the product of indigenous capital and entrepreneur-
ship. From its beginning, New Glasgow serviced the surrounding agricultural 
community and built ships for the carrying trade. Several of its merchant 
families prospered, and when ship-building was on the verge of collapse in the 
early 1880s, they invested substantially in the new industrialism. Teaming with 
skilled craftsmen, they used local resources to develop the Nova Scotia Steel 
and Coal Company which remained as the leader in the Canadian metals 
21 For an overview of the industrial development of Pictou County, see R.M. Guy, "Industrial 
Development and Urbanization of Pictou County to 1900" (MA thesis, Acadia University, 
1962); J.M. Cameron, Industrial History of the New Glasgow District (New Glasgow, 1970) 
and The Pictonian Colliers (Kentville, 1974). 
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Fig. 2. The Industrial Landscape of Pictou County, 1871 
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Fig. 4. The Industrial Landscape of Pictou County, 1911 
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industry until early in the twentieth century. Founded in the early 1870s, by 
World War I Scotia was a vertically integrated corporation of some 6,000 
employees which mined iron ore and coal, produced primary pig iron and steel, 
and manufactured a wide array of secondary metal products.22 By the close of 
the 1920s, however, Scotia was no longer a separate corporate entity, and its 
demise forced the loss of urban population in the County. 
Scotia Steel had its origin in 1872 as the Hope Iron Works when two Pictou 
County tradesmen of Scottish descent, Graham Fraser and George Forrest 
MacKay, formed a partnership to produce marine and railway forgings. 
MacKay had learned the blacksmith's trade in his father's New Glasgow shop. 
Fraser, by contrast, served his apprenticeship in blacksmithing at the Rhode 
Island Locomotive Works in Providence.23 The growing demand for forgings 
encouraged both men to form a new enterprise in 1874, the Nova Scotia Forge 
Company.24 This also prospered until the inadequacy of New Glasgow's water 
supply forced the company to relocate, in 1878, in Smelt Brook (renamed 
Trenton in 1882), a rural community situated two miles north of New Glasgow. 
Like other forges, Scotia used wrought and scrap iron, but during the 1870s and 
1880s technological changes in the metals industry influenced the course of local 
production. Pig iron and steel were increasingly used in quality forge work, but 
obtaining these materials regularly and in sufficient quantity was difficult. 
Nevertheless, it was, bönsidered uneconomical in the mid-1870s to produce either 
material in Pictou County because an integrated iron and steel complex would 
create a surplus in excess of local needs which was too costly to ship to 
extra-regional markets. Later, however, the National Policy's 1879 tariff 
schedule of $5 per ton on steel ingots made the proposal of establishing at least a 
steel plant more realistic. A profit could be earned because the freight rate for 
shipping steel products from Nova Scotia to the major market in Ontario 
averaged $4.50 per ton.25 To raise the capital for such a steel-making venture, 
Fraser and MacKay turned to the local mercantile community. 
Foremost among their backers were two of New Glasgow's leading merchant 
families, the Carmichaels and the McGregors.26 James C. Carmichael first 
22 Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company, Scotia: How Canada's Pioneer Steel Corporation was 
Evolved from a Country Forge (New Glasgow, 1912); P.K. Parker, "The Nova Scotia Steel and 
Coal Company: Entrepreneurship and Industrial Development" (BA thesis, Mount Allison 
University, 1979). 
23 Cameron, Industrial History, ch. IV; C.W. Parker, ed., Who's Who and Why in Canada, 1914, 
V(New York, 1915), p. 346. 
24 "Articles of Copartnership", G.F. MacKay MSS File, Public Archives of Nova Scotia 
[hereafter PANS]. 
25 W.J.A. Donald, The Canadian Iron and Steel Industry (New York, 1915), pp. 85 and 93. 
26 The importance of family and kinship ties in establishing businesses and the role of merchant 
families in funding nineteenth-century industrial enterprise are discussed in: P.D. Hall, "Family 
Structure and Economic Organization: Massachusetts Merchants, 1700-1850", in T.R. Hareven, 
Acadiensis 41 
established a general store at the head of navigation on the East River in 1809, 
anticipating correctly the future growth of New Glasgow as a market town. The 
business prospered and Carmichael's son, James William, subsequently 
expanded and diversified the business. The firm of J.W. Carmichael and 
Company eventually rose to become the community's principal shipyard, con-
structing thirty-nine vessels before the demise of shipbuilding in the early 1880s. 
As well, the firm managed a trading fleet in support of the regional coal industry 
and served as agents of the Bank of Nova Scotia.27 The McGregors likewise 
erected a substantial trading and shipping business. Roderick and James 
McGregor, sons of Rev. James D. McGregor, D.D., the first Presbyterian 
minister in the County, entered the wholesale-retail trade in 1830. By 1843, they 
had diversified their interests. James formed McGregor and Company and 
expanded into the hardware business. Roderick, in a separate and more 
prosperous venture with his sons, James Drummond and Peter Archibald, estab-
lished R. McGregor and Sons. They became wholesale and retail grocers, provi-
sion dealers, general merchants, and shippers.28 By the early 1880s, the 
Carmichaels and the McGregors were New Glasgow's leading merchant 
families.29 
Within New Glasgow, these two families were the cornerstones of a cohesive 
group which was sustained by inter-marriage and reinforced by shared social 
and community interests. James C. Carmichael married Christian McKenzie, 
sister of Captain George McKenzie, New Glasgow's most successful early ship-
builder, who was himself married to Sarah McGregor, sister of Roderick and 
James, the merchants, and daughter of Rev. James D. McGregor. The town's 
two wealthiest families thus became interrelated through marriage into the 
McKenzie family. A similar pattern emerged in the next generation. When 
James W. Carmichael married Maria McColl and James D. McGregor 
married Elizabeth McColl, and his sister, Ann, married Jeffrey McColl, 
shipping merchant and banker, the Carmichaels and the McGregors once again 
became related through an intermediate family. The social network now 
embraced three of the four shipping and mercantile families who remained 
active into the 1880s: the Carmichaels, the McGregors, and the McColls. The 
alliance was strengthened further when the fourth active shipper, Andrew 
ed.. Family and Kin in Urban Communities, 1700-1930 (New York, 1977), pp. 38-61; H .C 
Livesay and G. Porter, "The Financial Role of Merchants in the Development of U.S. Manufac-
turing", Explorations in Economic History, 9 (1971), pp. 63-87. 
27 Eastern Chronicle (New Glasgow), 4 May 1903; Montreal Standard, 5 May 1917; Teare's 
Directory, 1879 (Pictou, 1879), pp. 94-5. 
28 H.C. Ritchie, "Geneological Records" (unpublished typescript, New Glasgow Regional 
Library, 1952); Teare's Directory, p. 95. 
29 In 1882, the Carmichaels and the McGregors each had an estimated pecuniary strength of over 
$75,000; their closest competitor was rated at less than $40,000. Dun, Wiman and Company, The 
Mercantile Agency Reference Book, 1882 (Montreal, 1882), p. 840. 
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Walker, married Georgina McKenzie, daughter of Captain George McKenzie 
and niece of James C. Carmichael. The mercantile elite of New Glasgow were 
thus part of an extended family.30 
That Fraser and McKay should turn to this mercantile community for finan-
cial support was not surprising. Cooperation, certainly not opposition, was 
characteristic of the mercantile-industrial transition in Pictou County. After his 
apprenticeship in Rhode Island, Fraser was first employed in 1867 as a black-
smith at the Carmichael shipyard where his father, Thomas Fraser, was the 
construction foreman. When he left in 1869 to set up his own smithing business, 
J.W. Carmichael and Company awarded him several contracts. Fraser was 
also known to the McGregors, because his great, great grandfather, Simon 
Fraser, had been one of three elders who emigrated to Pictou County with Rev. 
James D. McGregor.31 George Forrest MacKay, in turn, married Mary J. 
Walker, sister of Andrew Walker.32 Together, Fraser and MacKay had 
developed one of the province's leading industrial operations whose assets had 
increased, in less than a decade, to equal those of the most successful mercantile 
houses in Pictou County.33 The merchant fraternity was well aware of this, and 
of the coal and iron producing potential of the region.34 Moreover, some of its 
members, as politicians, had debated the merits of the new National Policy.35 
Perhaps of most importance, this was a period of transition in shipping 
technologies, a passing from sail to steam; and the likely success of the proposed 
steel works promised the merchants a new source of earnings.36 Of the leading 
New Glasgow mercantile families, the Carmichaels, the McGregors, and the 
Walkers purchased shares in the new Steel Company (Figure 6). The McColls 
did not, apparently because Jeffrey McColl was suffering financial duress in 
connection with the operation of the Pictou Bank.37 In all, Pictou County 
investment accounted for 84 per cent of the subscribed shares; the remainder 
was raised principally in Halifax, and also in Guysborough and Antigonish 
30 The reconstruction of marriage patterns has been compiled from information in Ritchie, 
"Geneological Records". I am indebted to Paul Parker for discovering this rich source of 
information. 
31 Cameron, Industrial History, ch. VI. 
32 Ritchie, "Geneological Records". 
33 Dun, Wiman and Company, Mercantile Reference Book, 1882, p. 840. 
34 J.W. Carmichael was one of the first people to take out a coal lease in Pictou County after the 
monopoly of the General Mining Association was broken in 1857. He did so in 1861, but by 1864 
the lease had lapsed. RG 21, vol. 4, Coal Leases, PANS. 
35 For example, J.W. Carmichael represented Pictou as a Liberal from 1867 to 1872, and again 
from 1874 to 1878. J.P. MacPhie, Pictonians at Home and Abroad (Boston, 1914), p. 209. 
36 Rosemary E. Ommer, "Anticipating the Trend: the Pictou Ship Register, 1840-1889", 
Acadiensis, X (Autumn 1980), pp. 67-89. 
37 J.M. Cameron, "The Pictou Bank", Nova Scotia Historical Quarterly, 6 (June 1976), p. 129. 
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counties and in Montreal.38 
The steel works, which began operations in July, 1883, was the first in 
Canada to produce steel ingots.39 Despite a glutted domestic market in 1883 and 
reduced prices in 1884 and 1885, which fell even more in 1886, the demand for 
Scotia's products was enough to warrant increased production. Prices had 
sufficiently improved by 1887 that one year later Scotia paid an 8 per cent 
dividend on preferred shares.40 Of course, a favourable tariff schedule was essen-
tial to attain this rate of profit. New negotiations in 1887 had resulted in a duty 
of $9 per ton on puddled bars, $4 on pig iron, and $2 on scrap iron; imported iron 
and steel ingots, billets, blooms, and slabs were also charged $9 per ton.41 This 
arrangement placed a discriminatory duty against goods competing with 
Scotia's output, but allowed the company's material inputs to be imported at 
relatively low rates.42 By the close of 1888, the steel works was operating at full 
capacity. So, too, was the Forge Company, which was its largest customer. 
Considering their complementary operations, common location, and over-
lapping directorships, as well as their desire for greater efficiency in manage-
ment and operation, it was logical for the two enterprises to amalgamate in 1889 
as the Nova Scotia Steel and Forge Company.43 
During this initial growth phase, Scotia made a definite impact on the 
urban-industrial pattern of Pictou County. The wide variety of its output — 
38 "Prospectus of the Nova Scotia Steel Company, 1882" and "Letters Patent Incorporating the 
Nova Scotia Steel Company, Limited, 1882", Hawker Siddeley Papers, MS 4-106, Dalhousie 
University Archives [hereafter DUA]. 
39 Scotia initially made steel by the Siemens-Martin open-hearth process -using acid linings, but 
several years later introduced basic linings which permitted a wider range of material inputs. The 
Siemens-Martin process was favoured over the Bessemer method because it produced a stronger, 
higher quality steel which could sustain higher transportation costs. For an economist's 
perspective on innovations in the steel industry, see P. Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth 
Century America: An Economic Enquiry (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), pp. 138-41. 
40 Nova Scotia Steel Company, Report of Directors . . . 1883-1887 (New Glasgow, 1884-1888). 
With few exceptions, Scotia continued to pay at least an 8 per cent dividend on preferred shares 
until World War I. 
41 Donald, The Canadian Iron and Steel Industry, pp. 99 and 336; "Bounties for the Canadian 
Iron and Steel Industry", The Iron Age, 25 October 1906. 
42 Graham Fraser's reaction to the new tariff schedule reveals something of the business attitudes of 
the New Glasgow industrialists: "On the whole the duty is very favourable to us. I believe the 
Montreal people are now squealing very hard about having to pay such a large duty on steel 
billets". G. Fraser to T. Cantley, 16 May 1887, Thomas Cantley Papers, MG 1, no. 174, 
PANS. Thomas Cantley provides another illustration of the New Glasgow social network. He 
was a native of New Glasgow who had joined Scotia in 1885 as a salesman at the invitation of 
Simon A. Fraser, his friend and Graham Fraser's brother. Previously, Cantley had worked in 
B.S. McCurdy's store and then formed a business of his own with McCurdy as a silent partner. 
Later, he would rise to attain the positions of general manager and president of Scotia Steel. 
Parker, Who's Who, pp. 1778-9. 
43 Nova Scotia Steel and Forge Company, Report of Directors . . . 1889, p. 22. 
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"railway fishplates, plough plates, nail plate, bars and angles, tie plates, steel for 
agricultural implements, merchant steel in rounds, flats, and squares, angles and 
special sections, rivet steel, tramway and rail pits" — provided material inputs 
for local metal-working firms.44 By the late 1880s, there were at least seven 
establishments with direct material linkages to Scotia.45 Most were started by 
local Pictonians who had learned a metal-related trade, typically as a black-
smith or machinist, in either shipbuilding or coal mining, and then had set up a 
business of their own. Fraser Brothers, John Stewart, and I. Matheson and 
Company began in this way, and manufactured respectively marine engines, 
plows, and boilers for local customers before the steel works was established. 
Their rapid growth, and the appearance of several other metal-working firms in 
the mid-1880s, coincides directly with Scotia's expansion into steel production. 
Bailey Harrow Company, Robert Brown, and W.P. McNeil, when they initially 
began manufacturing, all made agricultural implements, and Donald Munro 
established the Munro Wire Works to fabricate all kinds of fencing and light 
structural steel products.46 In addition to selling materials to these firms, Scotia 
extended backward linkages to other sectors of the regional economy. The most 
substantial were to the coal and transportation industries. By the close of the 
1880s, Scotia was using some 30-36,000 tons of coal, or nearly 10 per cent of the 
total raised in Pictou County, to produce annually about 13,000 tons of finished 
steel products.47 Raw materials and finished products were both shipped over the 
Intercolonial Railway, stimulating further the industrial economy. 
The proximity of Scotia to the coal fields created certain economies, but the 
company's pig iron supply, a considerable production cost, had to be imported, 
chiefly from Scotland.48 Throughout the 1880s, domestic production accounted 
44 Nova Scotia Steel and Forge Company, Report of Directors . . . 1890, p. 33. 
45 Teare's Directory, 1879; Dun, Wiman and Company, Mercantile Reference Books, 1882-1890. 
46 Of these firms, the one which grew most rapidly was I. Matheson and Company. The firm 
itself illustrates well the continuing relationship between business success and New Glasgow's 
social network. Isaac Matheson, the firm's founder, was born at West River in Pictou County 
in 1814. He learned the blacksmith's trade in the coal mining industry, later married J.W. 
Carmichael's sister, and by the mid-1860s was the proprietor of the Acadia Foundry. Family 
ties were bound even tighter in the 1880s. James Matheson Carmichael married Christian 
Matheson, while his sister Christian Carmichael married William Grant Matheson. 
William, who had studied engineering at the University of New Brunswick and served his 
apprenticeship in Dundee, Scotland, succeeded his father, Isaac, as the head of the company. 
When the company was incorporated in 1896, however, James M. Carmichael was named as 
President and James C. McGregor as Vice-President. Eastern Chronicle, 12 September 
1930; Cameron, Industrial History, ch. I; Ritchie, "Geneological Records". 
47 Nova Scotia, Department of Mines, Report . . . for the Year 1880-1890 (Halifax, 1881-1891); 
Nova Scotia Steel Company, Report of Directors . . . 1882-1888. 
48 Scotia purchased most of its pig iron through the firm of William Jacks and Company of 
Glasgow. William Jacks also contracted with Scotia to supply skilled labour. Hawker Siddeley 
Papers, MS 4-106, DU A. 
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for only about one-third of total pig iron consumption, and by 1890 the gap was 
widening (Table 3). Nearly 90 per cent of Canadian output came from London-
derry, located some 150 km west of New Glasgow. Despite its relative impor-
tance, the Londonderry Iron Company had inherited the problems of its prede-
cessor, the bankrupt Acadian Iron Furnace Company: high transportation 
costs; limited markets; an inconsistent supply of good quality coke; and as a 
consequence, both inadequate and inconsistent revenues.49 Moreover, its pig iron 
was unsuited to Scotia's production techniques. The takeover of the London-
derry iron works in 1887 by Montreal interests, however, coincided with the 
upward revision in the same year of the duty on pig iron from $2 to $4 per ton.50 
This adjustment drove Scotia's production costs upward, at a time when the 
price of pig iron itself was rising from just over $19 per ton in 1886 to about $25 
in 1890 (Table 3). With supply and demand conditions so unstable (material 
costs alone jumped almost 40 per cent between 1886 and 1890), some of Scotia's 
directors embarked on a programme of diversification to create an iron works. 
The County's potential for iron production had been recognized for some 
time. The availability of coal was an obvious attraction. Other necessary raw 
materials, including iron ore and limestone, were known to the General Mining 
Association which had established an ill-fated and short-lived iron works in 
1829.51 By the 1880s, the various deposits of iron had been fully mapped and 
assessed to reveal an iron content ranging from 50 to 68 per cent.52 E. Gilpin, the 
Province's Inspector of Mines, was convinced that "the iron deposits . . . are 
more varied and of greater extent than elsewhere in the province, and from their 
relation to shipping and fuel flux are destined to play an important part in the 
future"." These opinions were confirmed in 1890 by Robert Chambers, the 
mining engineer of the prospective New Glasgow Iron, Coal, and Railway 
Company, who judged that the deposits along the East River alone were 
capable of supplying a furnace of 20,000 tons annual capacity for fifteen years. 
When mixed with other regional ores, pig iron could be produced "at a price 
entirely below any competition".54 
49 Donald, The Canadian Iron and Steel Industry, pp. 106-7 and 327; J.H. Bartlett, "The 
Manufacture of Iron in Canada", Transactions of the American Institute of Mining, 
Metallurgical and Petroleum Engineers, 14 (1885-86), pp. 539-41; C O . Macdonald, The Coal 
and Iron Industries of Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1909), pp. 233-48. 
50 Donald, The Canadian Iron and Steel Industry, p. 336. 
51 Bartlett, "Manufacture of Iron in Canada", p. 538; Cantley, "A Sketch of the Iron and Steel 
Industry", p. 325; Gesner, Industrial Resources, p. 258. 
52 See, for example, E. Gilpin, "The Iron Ores of Pictou County, Nova Scotia", Transactions of 
the American Institute of Mining Engineers (May 1895), pp. 1-26 and The Iron Ores of Nova 
Scotia (Montreal, 1891). 
53 E. Gilpin, "Report on the Iron Ores of Pictou County, Nova Scotia, 1890", RG 21, Series A, 
vol. 26, PANS. 
54 R.E. Chambers, "Report on the New Glasgow Iron, Coal, and Railway Company Properties 
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Substantial capital was required to establish the iron works. The blast furnace 
was estimated to cost $500,000. A railway to connect the ore deposits to the 
potential furnace site at Ferrona would require an additional $50,000. To secure 
this capital, a new pattern of financing and management emerged in Scotia's 
development. The mercantile interests, particularly J.D. McGregor and J.M. 
Carmichael, urged caution, arguing that if pig iron production were to be 
undertaken, then an entirely new and separate company should be formed, 
rather than risking Scotia's resources in the event the iron venture failed.55 This 
strategy was eventually accepted and pursued by Graham Fraser in 1888.56 
However, when the necessary capital could not be raised and this particular 
incorporation attempt failed, John F. Stairs of Halifax, an industrialist and 
federal politician, and J. Walter Allison, also of Halifax and a financier, were 
newly enlisted as directors for the company's successful 1891 incorporation and 
capitalization drive.57 New Glasgow interests — Fraser, MacKay, and Harvey 
Graham — retained control of the company, but the period of local entre-
preneurial capitalism was at an end. There was not sufficient capital within 
Pictou County to finance entirely a new round of industrial expansion. Scotia 
would hereafter be dependent on national and foreign money markets for its 
development capital. 
The blast furnace was "blown in" at Ferrona in 1892 and soon achieved a stable 
market despite a number of obstacles. Ferrona, located on the Intercolonial and 
situated approximately equidistant from the Bridgeville ores, coking coal at 
Westville, and the Trenton steel works, provided optimal accessibility to reduce 
production costs (see Figure 4). After an initial year of partial operation, the 
blast furnace was soon averaging an annual output of about 20,000 tons, or 
between one-third and one-half of the total Canadian production. Over half was 
consumed by Scotia's forge and newly upgraded steel plant; the remainder was 
sold elsewhere, chiefly to foundries in Ontario.58 To capture this particular 
trade, different strategies were advanced. Low prices were offered during 
periods of slack demand, such as the early 1890s.59 Overcoming high transporta-
tion costs was more troublesome. The Intercolonial Railway did offer com-
petitive freight rates from the Maritimes to Quebec, but through charges on the 
Outside the East River, 1890", Thomas Cantley Papers, MG 1, no. 174, PANS. 
55 Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company, Scotia, pp. 9-11; Donald, The Canadian Iron and Steel 
Industry, p. 112;; Cantley, "Sketch of the Iron and Steel Industry", p. 327. 
56 Nova Scotia, "An Act to Incorporate the New Glasgow Iron, Coal, and Railway Company, 
Limited" (Halifax^ 1888). Besides Fraser, other directors included G.E.R. Burpee, W. Jacks, H. 
Aitken, and D.C. Fraser. 
57 Nova Scotia, "An Act to Incorporate the New Glasgow Iron, Coal, and Railway Company, 
Limited" (Halifax, 1891). 
58 Nova Scotia Steel and Forge Company, Report of Directors . . . 1892, p. 39; Donald, The 
Canadian Iron and Steel Industry, p. 327; Guy, "Industrial Development", p. 122. 
59 Monetary Times (Toronto), 31 August 1894. 
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Grand Trunk and Canadian Pacific lines were uncontrollably higher. Shipment 
by water, at best seasonable, was considered; but the central Canadian railways 
threatened to retaliate by cancelling the preferential rates they had given to 
some of Scotia's largest Ontario customers, which would naturally force these 
foundries to purchase materials elsewhere.60 Price stability was therefore essen-
tial. To achieve this, the New Glasgow Iron, Coal, and Railway Company and 
the Londonderry Iron Company, Canada's major pig iron producers, entered 
into an agreement in 1896 ". . . for the regulation of prices, conditions, and 
terms upon which these companies shall sell their pig iron in the Province of 
Ontario and Quebec".61 Government assistance, however, remained critical. The 
tariff on imported wrought iron scrap was boosted from $2 to $3 per ton in 1894, 
while a newly introduced bounty provided $2 for each ton of puddled iron bars or 
steel billets the company produced.62 The various strategies proved successful, 
prompting the merger of the forge and steel works with the iron company in 
1895 to create the Nova Scotia Steel Company. The reconstituted board 
included from Pictou County, Graham Fraser, J.D. McGregor, G.F. MacKay, 
and H.S. Poole, from Halifax, J.F. Stairs, J. McNab, Adam Burns, and J.W. 
Allison, and from Quebec, Frank Ross.63 The merger was entirely logical. As an 
integrated unit, the new corporation would be more efficient, not only in 
administration and management,64 but also in planning material flows and in 
devising marketing strategies.65 
During this period of diversification in the 1890s, Scotia continued to 
influence the process of urbanization in Pictou County. The company's labour 
force at the forge and steel works rose from about 420 in 1890 to 750 in 1898.66 
Most workers lived in New Glasgow, but others resided in neighbouring 
Trenton, which doubled in population to almost 1,000 people. Some 250 men 
were employed at the blast furnace site, swelling the size of Ferrona.67 The 
60 J.F. Stairs to T. Cantley, 1 June 1894, Thomas Cantley Papers, MG 1, no. 174, PANS. 
61 "Memorandum of Agreement . . . 23 January, 1896", Hawker Siddeley Papers, MS 4-106, 
DUA. The prices quoted in this document are slightly less than those quoted on the Toronto 
market (see Table 3), and also indicate that the market was most competitive in southern 
Ontario. 
62 Donald, The Canadian Iron and Steel Industry, p. 336. 
63 Details of the merger discussions, which took place during 1893 and 1894, appear in the Thomas 
Cantley Papers, MG 1, no. 174, PANS. 
64 Economies in the metals industry are discussed in A. Chandler, The Visible Hand (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1977), pp. 258-72. 
65 "The supply of pig iron being entirely under their own control enables them to secure orders 
which otherwise would have gone past them". Nova Scotia Steel Company, Report of the 
Directors . . . 1896, p. 52. 
66 Cantley to Gilpin, 7 October 1890, RG 21, vol. 25(d), PANS; G.E. Drummond, "The Iron 
Industry in 1898", Canadian Mining Review, 18 (1899), p. 57. 
67 J.S. Barrie, "The Coal and Fron Industries of Eastern Canada", The Colliery Guardian, 15 
50 Acadiensis 
hamlets of Springville, Bridgeville, and Sunnybrae grew in support of nearby 
iron mining activity. In a similar way, employment in the coal and transporta-
tion sectors was supported by Scotia's business. The company annually pur-
chased about 130,000 tons of coal, or up to 15 per cent of the County's total 
output; and in some years it paid out more than $100,000 in freight charges on 
the Intercolonial.68Without Scotia's presence, the urbanization process in 
Pictou County would have been arrested through the 1890s. Stellarton actually 
lost population between 1891 and 1901, and the growth of other urban places 
was at a low ebb (see Table 2). Sectors of New Glasgow and Trenton's economy 
which in the 1880s had multiplied in scale, now either stabilized in size or 
subtracted strength (Table 4). Even Scotia experienced a temporary financial 
crisis in 1896 when severely depressed prices and reduced bounties caused finan-
cial losses which forced the company to reduce the wages and salaries of all 
workmen and officials.69 By the close of the decade, however, with the stimulus 
of markets opening on new resource frontiers across Canada, the "volume of 
business . . . done was larger than in any previous year in the Company's 
history".70 
Despite the upturn in business, weaknesses had appeared in the structure of 
the regional metals industry. Foremost, the manganiferous character of the East 
River ores made it difficult to produce foundry pig iron at the Ferrona iron 
works.71 To overcome this problem, Scotia tapped its holdings at Brookfield and 
Arisaig, and purchased ore from the Pictou Charcoal Iron Company and the 
Torbrooke Iron Company; but the use of these ores was not entirely satisfac-
tory, which led Scotia to examine other sources.72 One of these included the red 
hematites at Wabana on Bell Island, Newfoundland, which the company first 
tested in 1892 and purchased the next year for only $5,000. Within two years, 
Wabana ore comprised the major supply of iron for the Ferrona furnace. 
Despite the extra transportation costs of shipping from Newfoundland to Pictou 
County, a more economical pig iron was produced.73 Scotia continued to search 
for additional sources of ore, since the payment of federal bounties on foreign 
ores, including those of Newfoundland, remained in question during the initial 
years of the Laurier administration, and the issue was not fully resolved until 
1899.74 Moreover, Scotia sold some of its Bell Island properties in 1899 to the 
February 1901. 
68 Nova Scotia, Department of Mines, Report . . . for the Year, 1890-1899. 
69 Nova Scotia Steel Company, Report of the Directors . . . 1897, p. 58. 
70 Nova Scotia Steel Company, Report of the Directors . . . 1899, p. 76. 
71 Donald, The Canadian Iron and Steel Industry, p. 112. 
72 Nova Scotia, Department of Mines, Report for the Year, 1893, 1894, and 1896. 
73 "An Appreciation of Robert E. Chambers", Thomas Cantley Papers, MG 1, no. 167, folder 2, 
PANS. 
74 "Bounties", The Iron Age, 25 October 1906, pp. 1074-5. 
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Table 4 
THE URBAN ECONOMY OF NEW GLASGOW-TRENTON, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1882-1930 
(by Estimated Pecuniary Strength) 
Pecuniary Strength ($000s) 
Business Sector 1882 1892 1901 1912 1921 1930 
Metals manufacturing 54 1,082 710 1,281 1,425 222 
Other manufacturing 112 160 158 203 219 225 
Construction 7 19 25 63 176 61 
Trade 185 299 350 458 884 727 
Transportation and 
Communication 323 412 412 500 662 250 
Community and 
Business Services 38 40 48 93 105 65 
Totals 719 2,012 1,718 2,598 3,471 1,550 
Sources: Calculated from data in Dun, Wiman and Company and R.G. Dun 
and Company, Mercantile Agency Reference Books, 1882-1931. 
newly formed Dominion Iron and Steel Company for a reported $ 1,000,000, but 
by 1904, it was realized that the best iron deposits had been sold inadvertantly.75 
A flurry of exploration followed, chiefly in mainland Nova Scotia and on Bell 
Island, but also in Cuba and Brazil.76 In the end, the vast submarine deposits 
under Conception Bay off Bell Island were judged best, and indeed they pro-
vided enough ore for Scotia's own use and for export abroad. 
The profits realized from the sale of its Bell Island properties were used by 
Scotia to overcome another shortcoming of the Pictou resource base, the inade-
quacy of local coal for coking purposes. By the late 1890s, the Ferrona blast 
furnace was purchasing up to 80,000 tons of fuel annually from regional 
collieries. The company did not mine its own coal because central Canadian 
and foreign interests had gained control of the best reserves before Scotia's 
officials embarked on their expansionary drive in the 1880s. They did work 
several leases, but these failed to yield coal of sufficient quality or quantity to 
warrant development.77 This situation created several problems. A protracted 
75 Monetary Times, 5 August 1904, p. 106. 
76 "An Appreciation of Robert E. Chambers", Thomas Cantley Papers, MG 1, no. 167, folder 2, 
PANS; "Preliminary Report on Brazilian Iron Ores", Hawker Siddeley Papers, MS 4-106, 
DUA. 
77 Before World War I, Scotia held five different coal leases in Pictou County. See RG 21, vol. 4, 
Coal Leases, PANS. 
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strike in 1887 cut off Scotia's fuel supply, forcing the temporary closure of the 
melting furnace at the steel works and a consequent loss of orders.78 Prices were 
also subject to fluctuation. A more serious concern, however, was the quality of 
coke produced from mainland coal. Fuel efficiency was critical in the pig iron 
industry, and substantial economies could be won if a high grade coke were used. 
Early experiments with coke processed at the Intercolonial Coal Company's 
Drummond Mine at Westville did not prove successful; nor did a combination of 
Drummond and Springhill coal. Both were high in sulphur and ash content.79 By 
1898 a solution had been found: Cape Breton coal, purchased from the 
Dominion Coal Company, yielded a satisfactory coke which resulted in greater 
efficiency and substantially reduced production costs.80 Nonetheless, since an 
essential link in Scotia's integrated chain of operations remained in the hands of 
other interests, Scotia used the money earned from the sale of its iron holdings 
to the Dominion Iron and Steel Company to purchase, in 1900, the Cape 
Breton coal mining holdings of the General Mining Association.81 Although the 
press criticized this takeover as foolish and extravagant, by 1904 coal mining 
was the most profitable sector of the company.82 A coal washing plant and coke 
ovens were built at Sydney Mines in 1901 to supply the Ferrona blast furnace. 
By shipping coke, a less bulky and cleaner product than coal, significant 
handling and transportation costs were saved. 
Nevertheless, the geographical dispersion of Scotia's various activities 
remained a matter of concern. As early as 1897, the company had considered 
locating a blast furnace in either Sydney or Louisburg to minimize the costs of 
assembling materials. A new company, the Scotia Steel and Iron Company, 
was incorporated for this purpose, but achieved little because Scotia's directors 
failed to convince the federal government to extend the pig iron bounties beyond 
1902.83 Several joint ventures were considered during 1898 and 1899, including 
discussions with H.M. Whitney.about Scotia's participation in the formation of 
the Dominion Iron and Steel Company, but when these, too, went unrealized, 
Scotia pursued a careful policy of self-management and vertical integration.84 
78 Nova Scotia Steel Company, Report of the Directors . . . 1887, p. 14. 
79 Monetary Times, 12 January 1898; Cantley, "Sketch of the Iron and Steel Industry", pp. 328-9. 
80 Maritime Mining Record, 22 November 1899, p. 10; Canada, House of Commons, Debates 
(1903), p. 7934. 
81 The sale was negotiated by Thomas Cantley in London during 1899. Cantley also spent much 
time in Europe, particularly in Scotland and Germany, during the early 1900s signing iron ore 
and coal contracts and examining new forge and steel making technologies. Parker, Who's Who, 
p. 179; Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company, Souvenir 1908 (New Glasgow, 1908), p. 15. 
82 Maritime Mining Record, 20 February 1901, p. 12; and Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company, 
Report of the General Manager . . . 1909, p. 7. 
83 Canada, House of Commons, Debates (1903), p. 7933. 
84 Maritime Mining Record, 22 November 1899, p. 10. 
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The company was reorganized in 1901 as the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal 
Company, and with increased capitalization in hand, set about the task of 
building a fully integrated iron and steel making complex at Sydney Mines.85 
There were good reasons for choosing this site. Cost analyses undertaken by the 
company during the 1890s suggested that a ton of pig iron could be produced for 
$5.50 at Sydney Mines, compared to actual costs of $10.50 at Ferrona (Table 5). 
Further savings of 20 per cent could be realized in the conversion of pig iron to 
steel billets. When completed in July 1905, the complex was judged the most 
efficient and technically advanced in Canada. By the close of the decade, Scotia 
employed some 2,300 coal miners and 700 iron and steel workers in Cape 
Breton alone. Sydney Mines was itself a "Scotia" town; rows of company built 
cottages housed many of the town's 7,500 residents.86 
The growth of Scotia's Cape Breton interests had immediate repercussions 
on the economy of Pictou County. Closure of the blast furnace and iron mining 
operations greatly reduced the population of Ferrona; and the removal of the 
open hearth furnaces had a similar effect on Trenton. Both closures, and the 
simultaneous opening of Scotia's Marsh Colliery at Coalburn, resulted in lost 
orders for the County's coal industry (although these losses were concealed by 
the substantial and simultaneous increase in the extra-regional demand for the 
County's coal at this time)." On balance, however, the initial impact of Scotia's 
internal reorganization upon Pictou County was positive. With expansion, the 
company's primary iron and steel output doubled in size to average over 70,000 
tons annually; and virtually all of this was shipped from Sydney Mines to the 
metal-working factories of New Glasgow and Trenton for use in either forging 
or conversion to steel products. Bounties, protective tariffs and preferential 
freight rates, so essential to the metals industry, encouraged the distribution of a 
varied range of goods to distant markets. For example, the steel products of 
New Glasgow and Trenton firms went mainly to the agricultural implements 
manufacturing industry in Ontario; Scotia's marine forgings were shipped to 
Victoria, Vancouver, Owen Sound, Levis, and some Maritime cities.88 Scotia 
Steel's competitiveness in these markets was facilitated by an efficient and 
productive plant at Trenton where a number of improvements were made 
between 1906 and 1912:89 the forge was entirely rebuilt and equipped with the 
85 The company remained dominated by Nova Scotia financiers and industrialists. For a succinct 
discussion of the events leading to the incorporation, see D. Frank, "The Cape Breton Coal 
Industry", pp. 13-4. 
86 Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company, Report of the General Manager . . . 1910, p. 17. 
87 Cameron, Pictonian Colliers, p. 98; Monetary Times, 19 August 1904. The mine was in 
production from 1902 to 1909, averaging about 40,000 tons of coal annually. 
88 Thomas Cantley Papers, MG 1, vol. 167, folder 1913, PANS. 
89 Cameron, Industrial History, ch. V; Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company, Report of the 
General Manager . . . 1905-1912. 
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Table 5 
ESTIMATED COSTS OF PTG IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION 
AT FERRONA AND SYDNEY MINES 
Item 
Iron ore 
Coke 
Limestone 
Repairs 
Labour 
Incidentals 
Cost: one ton pig iron 
Ferrona 
Required 
Amount 
2.0 tons 
1.4 tons 
.5 tons 
Cost 
per 
Ton 
$1.75 
3.00 
1.00 
Total 
$3.50 
3.75 
.50 
1.00 
1.30 
.40 
Sydney Mines 
Required 
Amount 
1.80 tons 
1.25 tons 
.75 tons 
Cost 
per 
Ton 
$1.00 
1.52 
.53 
i 
Total 
$1.80 
1.80 
.40 
| 1.50 
10.50 5.50 
Cost: 
Conversion to steel 
Cost: one ton steel 
.00 
18.50 
5.00 
10.50 
Sources: RG 21, vol. 25(d), PANS; P.T. McGrath, "The Manufacture of 
Iron and Steel in Cape Breton", The Engineering Magazine, 2 (June 
1901), pp. 582-3. 
a Based upon actual production costs at Ferrona (pig iron) and Trenton (steel) 
using Pictou County materials during 1892-1893. 
b Based upon production costs at Ferrona using Wabana ore and Cape 
Breton coke during 1896-1898. 
Acadiensis 55 
most advanced hydraulic presses available; a new railway axle plant was 
developed which immediately supplied over 60 per cent of the Canadian 
market; a new 28-inch cogging mill was added; expensive heating furnaces were 
replaced; and most other operations, including the plate mill and nut and bolt 
division, were either expanded or upgraded. The company's labour force at these 
facilities, which totalled about 800 in 1910, increased by some 900 employees 
shortly after the Eastern Car Company was organized in 1912 as a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Scotia.90 This move towards further diversification and 
vertical integration can be justified solely by the growing demand for railway 
rolling stock both in Canada and abroad; in the process, Scotia also improved 
its internal economics of scale by securing a guaranteed buyer for its steel 
products in a market which was becoming increasingly dominated by Hamil-
ton's newly organized Steel Company of Canada (Figure 7).91 
Throughout this period, Scotia's rolling mills continued to supply specialized 
materials to local metal-working industries. These firms had grown substan-
tially since the business downturn of the mid-1890s to produce a wide variety of 
finished goods for regional and national markets.92 Bailey-Underwood and the 
Brown Machine Company made agricultural implements, while bridges and 
structural steel work were produced by both W.P. McNeil and John Stewart. I. . 
Matheson and Company continued to make boilers and engage in foundry 
work, and J.W. Cumming Manufacturing Company supplied mining equip-
ment and forgings. The products of the Steel Furnishing Company included 
springs, mattresses, and office furniture. The Munro Wire Works manufactured 
various kinds of fencing. Finally, the Fraser Machine and Motor Company 
built marine engines for fishing boats, and the Canada Tool and Specialty 
Company filled custom orders for tools and other items. The labour force of 
these firms in 1912 totalled some 850 workers, an increase of almost 50 per cent 
since the late 1890s. Clearly, the continued growth of these smaller metal-
working firms was assisted by Scotia's ability to supply specialized materials 
quickly and with minimal transportation costs. Other relationships, however, 
including family ties, the interchange of personnel, and capitalization assistance, 
should not be overlooked (Figure 7). In fact, these types of linkages were not 
limited to Pictou County. At Sydney Mines, H.T. Sutherland, President of 
Thompson and Sutherland and brother-in-law of Thomas Cantley, then 
90 MG 1, no. 398, Eastern Car Company file, PANS; Cameron, Industrial History, ch. VII; New 
Glasgow et ai. Town Councils, Nova Scotia's Industrial Centre (New Glasgow, 1916), pp. 
53-5. 
91 D. Kerr, "The .Location of the Iron and Steel Industry in Canada", in R.L. Gentilcore, ed., 
Geographical Approaches to Canadian Problems (Toronto, 1971), pp. 59-68; Donald, The 
Canadian Iron and Steel Industry, pp. 219-22. 
92 Canadian Manufacture's Association, Industrial Ascendency of Nova Scotia; R.G. Dun and 
Company, The Mercantile Reference Book, 1912. 
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N o v a Scotia 
Steel a n d Coa l Co. 
( Capitalization 14,000,000 ) 
Inc. 1901 
N e w G l a s g o w 
M e t a l - w o r k i n g Industries 
1912 
I —\ Carmichael Family Estate 
I 1ZZ 
New Glasgow 
Family Directors 
J.D. McGregor (Merchant • Shipper)-
. I J.C. McGregor (Merchant - Shipper)-
L
- U - G. F. McKay ( Retired Industrialist) 
T. Cantley (General Manager) 
R.E.Chambers (Ore Mines Manager) 
Resource Sectc 
r 
Primary Manufacturing 
L 
r 
Secondary Manufacturing 
L i\ 
Transportation 
Subsidiary Company * j 
Iron Ore Mining 
(WabanaNf ld.) 
Coal Mining 
( Sydney Mines ) 
Limestone Quarrying 
(Pt. Edwards) 
Lumbering 
(N .S .andNf ld . ) 
Iron and Steel 
(Sydney Mines) 
Coke 
( Sydney Mines ) 
Rolling Mills: 
industrial materials ( Trenton ) 
Forging and Steel Finishing 
( Trenton ) 
Railroad 
Shipping Fleet (Cape Breton) 
Eastern Car Co. 
(Trenton) 
W.P. McNei l«. Co. 
( Bridges, structural steel ) 
I. Matheson & Co. 
( Founders, boiler - makers) 
Brown Machine Co. 
(Agricultural implements) 
Munro Wire Works 
( Steel and wire fencing ) 
Bailey • Underwood 
(Agricultural implements) 
J.W. Cumming & Son 
(Mining tools and forgings) 
Fraser Machine & Motor Co. 
(Marine engines) 
The Steel Finishing Co. 
(Furniture) 
John Stewart 
(Bridges) 
\J Canada Tool and Specialty Co. 
(Tools) 
1912 Linkages 
»- Material flow 
* • Capital flow 
^- Family tie 
Estimated Pecuniary Strength 
• under $20,000 
• $ 20 • 35,000 
• $35-50,000 
• $50-75,000 
Fig. 7. The organization of the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company and 
Linkages with Metal-Working Industries, 1912 
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General Manager of Scotia, built a foundry and used Scotia's materials to make 
stoves for the company's chain of hardware stores.93 
The development of the metals industry in the early twentieth century pro-
pelled a new round of town growth in Pictou County. Spurred by extra-regional 
demand and the artificial stimulus of war, the manufacturing output of New 
Glasgow and Trenton multiplied more than tenfold between 1900 and 1917, the 
peak of wartime production. As early as 1911, a factory survey by the provincial 
government had revealed that fully two-thirds of New Glasgow's industrial 
labour force and more than 90 per cent of Trenton's were engaged in the metals 
industry;94 and this position of dominance was compounded during the war as 
factories turned to the production of munitions and Scotia embarked on a 
limited programme of shipbuilding.95 Factories in Pictou County produced 
nearly $32,000,000 in war-related goods, or about 4 per cent of the Canadian 
total.96 Scotia alone was awarded munitions contracts totalling at least 
$30,000,000, and the fact that Thomas Cantley served on the federal govern-
ment's Shell Committee was no doubt instrumental in Scotia's ability to attract 
this type of manufacturing.97 As a consequence of this concentrated wartime 
effort, New Glasgow's population doubled and Trenton's tripled between 1901 
and 1921. The war effort had pushed the manufacturing labour force of both 
towns to an all-time high in 1917 of 3,156 men and women, and town growth 
occurred simultaneously. The temporary thrust of wartime production, how-
ever, was quickly withdrawn: manufacturing employment dropped to 2,655 in 
1918 and stood at only 1,284 in 1919.98 Unemployment became a common 
experience. There was a slight recovery during the 1920s , so that by 1931 
Trenton provided industrial jobs for 784 workers and New Glasgow for 604; but 
even this advance failed to recapture the pre-war level of employment in 1911 
93 Eastern Chronicle, 24 January 1935. 
94 Nova Scotia, Journals and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, I911, Appendix 15. 
95 The federal government provided financial assistance between 1917 and 1920 for Scotia to build 
seven small freighters of up to 2,800 tons in size. Larger ships could not be built at Trenton 
because of the restricted size of the shipyard and Scotia's limited steel fabricating facilities. 
Scotia was even incapable of building ships that the company itself could use in the Wabana to 
Cape Breton iron trade. In fact, Scotia favoured Halifax as the province's most suitable 
shipbuilding location. "Resources of the Province of Nova Scotia as Regards Steel-Ship 
Construction", Thomas Cantley Papers, MG 1, no. 167, folder 7, PANS; and "Shipbuilding", 
Hawker Siddeley Papers, MS 4-106, DUA. 
96 By comparison, Montreal was awarded contracts totalling $162,203,807; Toronto, $153,155,974; 
and Hamilton $68,896,058. MG 30, B4, vol. 36, F.E. Hirschfile, Public Archives of Canada. I 
am indebted to Peter Rider, National Museum of Man, for drawing my attention to the source of 
these data. 
97 Cameron, Industrial History, chap. VI; M. Bliss, A Canadian Millionaire (Toronto, 1978), p. 
245. 
98 Canada, Census of Industry, "Preliminary Report: Industrial Statistics of the Maritime 
Provinces for 1919" (Ottawa, 1922). 
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when New Glasgow recorded 776 manufacturing employees and Trenton 
1,182." As a result, the urban economies of both towns suffered considerably, 
forcing almost all sectors to decline in financial strength (see Table 4). It was 
therefore inevitable that New Glasgow and Trenton should record population 
losses between 1921 and 1931. The urban-industrial economy had begun to 
collapse. 
The cessation of wartime contracts alone is not sufficient to explain the 
decline of the metals industry and the consequent loss of urban population in 
Pictou County. Nor was the local resource base a decisive factor; Scotia's move 
to Cape Breton demonstrated that at least metal-working was still economi-
cally feasible in the County. While the immediate post-war recession lessened 
the external demand for marine forgings, mining equipment, and railway axles 
and cars — all key products in the region's export base — these same products 
were again in demand by the late 1920s, and a share of the market, albeit a 
smaller one, had been recaptured. Therefore, the most plausible reasons for the 
urban-industrial collapse are likely associated with the removal of the very 
incentives that initially propelled the metals industry to prominence: entre-
preneurial initiative and the social milieu of community; government assistance 
in the guise of freight rate preferences, bounties, tariff protection, and 
grants-in-aid for infrastructural development; the internal economies of scale of 
Scotia, a vertically integrated organization; and the external economics of an 
integrated industrial complex, such as New Glasgow-Trenton. 
Following Confederation, Pictou County was pulled incessantly into the 
national economy. Indeed, the basic contours of Canada's heartland-hinterland 
space economy were drawn in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
As an industrial heartland emerged in southern Ontario and Quebec, the 
competitiveness of the periphery, comprised of highly localized regions such as 
Pictou County, was placed in jeopardy. From a theoretical perspective, it can 
be argued that advantages of external economies will gradually accrue to a 
developing heartland economy, forcing competitors in the periphery out of 
production. To test this proposition, data have been assembled which measure 
these economies as well as costs of production in selected towns and cities that 
competed in the Canadian metals industry (Tables 6 and 7). Because of certain 
deficiencies, these data must be interpreted carefully;100 but they do suggest the 
comparative advantages and competitive position of New Glasgow and Trenton. 
Manufacturing establishments in the selected communities were generally 
comparable in average size, capitalization, and output. In terms of scale 
99 Canada, Census of Canada, 1911, vol. 3, Tables 7 and 11; Canada, Census of Industry, 
"Manufacturing Industries of the Maritime Provinces, 1931" (Ottawa, 1933). 
100 Because it is impossible to obtain data for only metal-making and metal-working industries in 
individual cities, we are forced to rely on aggregate data for all manufacturing types. This 
problem is not too serious, because the metals industry in the selected towns and cities clearly 
dominated the manufacturing structure. 
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Table 7 
MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION COSTS IN SELECTED 
CANADIAN METAL-MAKING AND METAL-WORKING TOWNS 
AND CITIES, 1900-1930 
1900 1910 1920 1930 
New Glasgow-Trenton 
Average size of establishments 
Material costs/output 
Labour costs/output 
Total costs/output 
Sydney Mines 
Average size of establishments 
Material costs/output 
Labour costs/output 
Total costs/output 
Sydney 
Average size of establishments 
Material costs/output 
Labour costs/output 
Total costs/output 
Hamilton 
Average size of establishments 
Material costs/output 
Labour costs/output 
Total costs/output 
Sault Ste. Marie 
Average size of establishments 
Material costs/output 
Labour costs/output 
Total costs/ output 
20 
.45 
.36 
.81 
30 
.52 
.32 
.84 
44 
.52 
.23 
.75 
50 
.24 
.40 
.62 
68 
.54 
.28 
.83 
84 
.65 
.11 
.76 
195 
.18 
.23 
.41 
58 
.51 
.21 
.72 
22 
.40 
.34 
.74 
35 
.64 
.16 
.80 
21 
.71 
.08 
.79 
24 
.54 
.13 
.67 
40 
.49 
.24 
.73 
28 
.54 
.16 
.70 
49 
.59 
.20 
.79 
72 
.44 
.19 
.63 
70 
.45 
.23 
.68 
49 
.46 
.18 
.64 
Source: See Table 6. 
Acadiensis 61 
economies, therefore, there was little initially to differentiate New Glasgow and 
Trenton from, say, Hamilton. Only in the 1920s did Hamilton move ahead in 
average plant size, which is helpful in explaining the decreasing ratios there of 
material costs/output and labour costs/output. In the Hamilton case, this 
process of reducing costs was aided by the nearby automobile industry's demand 
for metal products,101 and by the Ontario government's assistance in acquiring 
access to cheaper coal and iron ore. 102 By contrast, the industrial market for 
steel in the Maritimes was quite limited, and the Nova Scotia government did 
little to compensate the provincial steel industry for the loss of federal bounties 
in 1911. In addition, the federal government's policy of granting rebates on coal 
imports after 1907 meant that Nova Scotia's metal manufacturers lost the cost 
advantage of native coal.103 Thus, faced with rising costs as a result of the loss of 
incentives previously awarded under the aegis of the National Policy, the 
industrial economy of New Glasgow and Trenton needed to maintain an 
efficient and productive industry to compete successfully in national markets. 
This was partially accomplished which is indicated by advances in certain 
structural indices — capital/labour, output/capital, and output/labour — but 
relative to other places, notably Hamilton, the competitive position of the 
Pictou metals towns deteriorated considerably between 1910 and 1930. Indeed, 
by 1930 Hamilton's ratio of net output to capital investment — that is, its manu-
facturing productivity — was twice as great as that of the Pictou metals towns. 
In 1910 there was only a marginal difference. 
To compensate for growing losses in comparative advantage, a favourable 
freight rate structure was essential. The Intercolonial Railway pursued such a 
policy from the early 1870s until it was merged into the Canadian National 
Railway. Thereafter, post-war inflation and the levelling of the Intercolonial's 
rates with other Canadian lines drove rates upwards by as much as 140 to 216 
per cent.104 This made it more costly for Pictou County's metal firms not only to 
reach distant markets, but also to purchase industrial materials, even from 
Cape Breton. The case of the J.W. Cumming Manufacturing Company 
illustrates well the predicament facing local industries.105 With wartime profits 
and stock market financing, Cumming was the first metals company in the 
Maritimes to invest in the development of a steel foundry equipped with an 
electric melting furnace. Besides engaging in structural steel work for regional 
101 T. Traves, "The Political Economy of the Steel Tariff, in The State and Enterprise: Canadian 
Manufacturing and the Federal Government, 1917-1931 (Toronto, 1979), pp. 121-54. 
102 O.J. McDiarmid, Commercial Policy in the Canadian Economy (Cambridge, 1946), p. 220; 
H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development (Toronto, 1974), pp. 125-31. 
103 Report of the Royal Commission on Coal. 1946 (Ottawa, 1947), pp. 575-7. 
104 Forbes, "Misguided Symmetry", p. 67. 
105 The case of the Cumming Manufacturing Company has been developed from Evidence, Board 
of Railway Commissioners, 1926, vol. 483, pp. 397-8, typescript, Provincial Archives of New 
Brunswick; Parker, Who's Who, p. 244. 
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construction projects, the firm had become the major Canadian producer of 
wheels and axles for mining cars. It even maintained an office and warehouse in 
Lethbridge, Alberta to service its western Canadian customers. By 1922, 
however, control of this nation-wide market was severely threatened by the 
change in freight rates. In fact, Cumming's chief competitor, a firm in Liver-
pool, England, could enter the Kootenay mining district over the Canadian 
Pacific rail line at a more competitive rate. Moreover, the firm's production 
costs had risen because the Trenton steel works could no longer supply 
Cumming with all of its required materials. These came instead from the 
Dominion Steel plant in Sydney, which itself had been forced to increase prices 
to accommodate the changing structure of intra-regional freight rates. Less than 
carload lots were particularly expensive. Clearly, the increase in transportation 
costs was a major liability to sustained economic growth in Pictou County. 
The 1920s thus appears as the critical decade in the devolution of the metals 
industry. Freight rate increases stole business elsewhere when Hamilton was 
emerging as the most productive and cost efficient steel centre in Canada. 
Nonetheless, several firms such as Cumming Manufacturing pursued new 
corporate strategies and technologies to maintain a competitive edge. The 
prevailing Canadian tariff structure provided generally adequate protection for 
these specialized firms and even for Scotia's forge and steel fabricating opera-
tions.106 But other adaptations created negative consequences. On 21 March 
1921, the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company was merged into the realm of 
the British Empire Steel Corporation (Besco). The entrepreneurs who originally 
developed Scotia had previously either retired or assumed less responsibility in 
company management: tradesmen G.F. MacKay in 1889 and Graham Fraser in 
1903; mercantile backers J.M. Carmichael in 1894 and J.D. McGregor in 
1914.107 The New Glasgow dominated board had withstood a Montreal-based 
takeover attempt in 1910, but control was eventually relinquished in 1917 to the 
American investment firm of Hayden, Stone and Company which had supplied 
Scotia with considerable amounts of working capital. Scotia's President, 
Thomas Cantley, was replaced by an American steelmaker, F.H. Crockard. 
Although "one of the bright stars of the United States Steel Corporation's 
galaxy of subsidiary corporations", Crockard possessed only limited experience 
in managing a fully integrated company. Subsequently, in an attempt to effect 
greater economies of scale and efficiency in coal mining and steel manufacturing 
along the lines practised by U.S. Steel, Scotia was merged into the Besco 
106 Traves, "The Political Economy of the Steel Tariff", pp. 139-47. 
107 Fraser and Carmichael both left Scotia over disputes concerning financial matters. MacKay, 
who quit plant supervision in 1889, and McGregor both remained as directors until World War 
I, but their initial leadership role had been relinquished earlier to Robert Harris, the Halifax 
financier, and Thomas Cantley. See J.M. Carmichael to J.F. Stairs, 9 October 1894, MG 2, 
no. 330, PANS; Cameron, Industrial History, ch. IV; Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company, 
Annual Reports, 1882-1915. 
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conglomerate along with the Dominion Steel Corporation and the Halifax 
Shipyards Limited.108 
The consequences of this merger proved disastrous for the metals industry in 
New Glasgow and Trenton. The cogging mill was dismantled in favour of the 
Sydney facilities, and although the rolling mills, forge, and axle and car plants 
remained in operation, they were neither expanded nor improved after 1917.109 
The primary iron and steel facilities at Sydney Mines were also closed, thereby 
ending the specialized material exchange between Scotia's operations in Cape 
Breton and Pictou County, and within the New Glasgow and Trenton metal-
working complex itself. This ultimately affected efficiency and productivity as 
the analysis of the structural indices revealed (see Table 6). Of equal impor-
tance, the merger also dismantled the economies of vertical integration so care-
fully worked out by Scotia prior to World War I. It further destroyed the net-
work of social connections in Pictou County — the initial organizing force of 
the metals industry — as a factor of development. Although a few of the sons of 
the founders of Scotia had followed their fathers into the company,110 such 
relationships would play little part and were of limited importance within an 
international corporate structure. Besco subsequently experienced financial 
difficulties, and in 1926 it was placed in receivership; by 1928, the Dominion 
Steel and Coal Corporation had been formed to take over the company.111 
Circumstances of external control and financial difficulties obviously 
contributed to Scotia's diminished role and forced Pictou County's metals 
industry to assume a more peripheral position within the Canadian economy. 
"Increase of population is rather the result of mercantile prosperity than the 
cause of it . . . and in accordance with this law of city growth, neither Halifax 
nor any other town in the Province can become a great commercial emporium, 
unless as a pre-requisite it becomes a seat of manufacturing activity".112 This 
statement, written in 1874 by Duncan Campbell, author and industrial pro-
moter, emphasized forceably that for towns and cities of the Maritimes to grow 
and prosper, they had, of necessity, to develop a manufacturing base. Certainly 
this was the path to importance followed by the large cities of the North 
American seaboard. Many Maritime communities did, of course, make the 
transition from mercantile to industrial capitalism. Against the background of 
regional economic transformation, this transition was particularly evident in the 
metals towns of Pictou County. Building on entrepreneurial initiative and 
108 This takeover is assessed succinctly by D. Frank, "The Cape Breton Coal Industry", pp. 13-7. 
Crockard had undertaken a similar task for United States Steel when the giant conglomerate 
took over steel-making operations in Birmingham, Alabama. I am indebted to Professor Alfred 
Chandler for this information, personal communication, 5 November 1980. 
109 Hawker Siddeley Papers, MS 4-106, DU A. 
110 Ritchie, "Geneological Records". 
111 Traves, "The Political Economy of the Steel Tariff, pp. 132-7. 
112 Campbell, A History of Nova Scotia, p. 508. 
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certain initial comparative advantages, including a relatively rich resource base 
of coal and iron ore, experience in marketing and distributing products abroad, 
and cheaper industrial materials and labour, local tradesmen and merchants 
joined together to develop one of Canada's first and largest vertically integrated 
corporations, the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company. But entrepreneurs in 
Nova Scotia were obliged to work within the necessary framework of govern-
ment support. Freight rate concessions and tariff protection were essential to 
compensate for the long haul to distant markets and the existence of strong 
external competition. These measures became increasingly more important and 
essential as Pictou County's comparative advantages in manufacturing dimin-
ished in favour of Ontario's emerging heartland economy. With mounting 
political pressure, chiefly from western Canada but also from central Canadian 
steel makers, these devices of regional integration were pared away and the 
metals industry in Pictou County suffered steady decline, forcing population 
losses upon New Glasgow and Trenton. 
As communities of a hinterland region, the towns and cities of the Maritimes 
could only grow in size mainly by trading goods with external markets. Usually 
the goods sent from a hinterland region are staple commodities rather than 
manufactured products. This is so because, theoretically, heartland cities 
possess advantages which render the production of secondary manufacturing 
cheaper and more productive and efficient than in their hinterland counter-
parts.113 According to this particular law of city growth, it can be argued that 
without government assistance which compensates hinterland manufacturing 
cities for their comparative disadvantages in producing secondary products, it 
was inevitable that an urban-industrial collapse would take place in the Mari-
times. The mercantile-industrial transition could not be sustained. Efforts to 
stave off decline during the 1920s, such as the attempt by Besco to rationalize its 
internal economies of scale by concentrating iron and steel production solely in 
Sydney, might have worked, but only if government policies continued to facili-
tate the export of regional products. Pictou County's metals industry suffered, 
therefore, not only from its growing inability to remain competitive within an 
integrated national market, but also from its inability to remain an essential link 
in the metals economy of Nova Scotia. In Besco's scheme of corporate reor-
ganization and concentration, the industrial complex of New Glasgow and 
Trenton was assigned secondary status. The innovative role of Pictou County's 
community minded entrepreneurs was banished, to be replaced by an external 
agent of management. Thus, the bases of effective and sustained growth had 
been stripped, one by one and gradually over time, from the County. By the 
close of the 1920s, the accumulated disadvantages of a peripheral location were 
clearly apparent as factories closed, unemployment increased, and people 
moved away from New Glasgow and Trenton. 
113 McCann, "Staples and the New Industrialism", pp. 48-52. 
